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THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:
THE FIRST CONGRESS, 1789-1791

BY DAVID P. CURRIE*

Judicial review of legislative and executive action
has been such a success in the United States that we
tend to look exclusively to the courts for guidance in
interpreting the Constitution. The stock of judicial
precedents is rich, accessible, and familiar, but it
does not exhaust the relevant materials. Members of
Congress and executive officers, no less than judges,
swear to uphold the Constitution, and they interpret
it every day in making and applying the law. Like
judges, they often engage in extensive and enlightening debates over the constitutional issues that
confront them. Like judges, they also leave voluminous records of their deliberations-from statutes
and legislative hearings, reports, and debates to
presidential messages, proclamations, and opinions
of the Attorneys General, to mention only a few.'
Legislative and executive opinions respecting
some of the great controversies are widely known.
The President's right to remove executive officers
and Congress's power to establish a bank are two
early examples. In the main, however, legislative
and executive precedents are less familiar than judicial ones. The aim of this study is to begin to remedy
that deficiency, in the conviction that both
Congress and the Executive have a great deal to tell
us about the Constitution.
New Hampshire, the decisive ninth state under
Article VII, ratified the Philadelphia Constitution
* Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law and
Interim Dean, The University of Chicago.
1Most of the debates reported in this paper are taken from volumes
I and 2 of the Annals of Congress, which were gleaned from contemporaneous newspaper reports by Gales and Seaton and published in 1834.
Other sources have recently been collected by the First Federal
Congress Project in Washington, D.C. and are being published under
the title Documentary History of the First Federal Congress (Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1988- ) [hereafter cited as Doc Hist].
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on June 21, 1788. Elections were held pursuant to
rules specified by the outgoing Confederation
Congress, and the new House and Senate convened
in New York on March 4, 1789. It took a month and
more than one stem summons to produce a Senate
quorum, and neither North Carolina nor Rhode
Island had yet signed on. By April, however, both
Houses were in business; and their business was to
set up the government of the United States.
For the Constitution, as Chief Justice Marshall
would later remind us, laid down only the "great outlines" of the governmental structure; translating the
generalities of this noble instrument into concrete
and functioning institutions was deliberately left to
Congress. The task was one partly of interpretation
and partly of interstitial creation, for the Framers
had been too wise to attempt to regulate all the
details themselves-although for obvious reasons the
structural provisions are among the most specific in
the entire document. Thus, in a very real sense it
can be said that the First Congress was a sort of continuing constitutional convention-and not simply
because so many of its members-James Madison,
Oliver Ellsworth, Elbridge Gerry, Rufus King, Robert
Morris, and William Paterson being only the most
conspicuous examples-had helped to compose or to
ratify the Constitution itself.
On April 6 the votes of the presidential electors
were counted before a joint session of both Houses, as
Article II prescribed. In accord with that provision,
each of the sixty-nine electors had cast two votes. As
expected, each had given one vote to George
Washington; John Adams was second with thirtyfour votes and thus became Vice-President. Acutely
aware that everything he or Congress did would set a
precedent,2 Washington urged the legislators to permit "no local prejudices or attachments, no separate
views, nor party animosities" to distract them from
laying the foundations of national policy "in the pure
and immutable principles of private morality."'

2 See Washington's letter of May 5, 1789, asking Madison to draft
a response to the House's reply to his inaugural address: "As the first of
everything, in our situation will serve to establish a Precedent, it is devoutly wished on my part, that these precedents may be fixed on true
principles." W. Abbott, ed, 2 The Papers of George Washington
(Presidential Series) 216-17 (University Press of Virginia, 1987).
He did not mention Pareto optimality. Tsk, tsk.

2

With that he left them to do their work; and work
they did.
The First Congress determined its own procedures, established the great executive departments,
and set up the federal judiciary. It enacted a system
of taxation, provided for payment of Revolutionary
debts, and erected a national bank. It made provision for national defense, regulated relations with
Indian tribes, and (in the Senate) advised the
President on foreign affairs. It passed statutes
respecting naturalization, patents and copyrights,
and federal crimes. It regulated relations among
existing states and admitted new ones while providing for the administration of territories and the
establishment of a permanent seat of government.
In doing all this Congress interpreted a surprising
number of provisions of the Constitution, finding
time along the way to propose not ten but twelve
additional articles to improve the document itself.
By the time the First Congress adjourned in 1791
the country had a much clearer idea of what the
Constitution meant than when that body had first
met in 1789.
I have selected only a few of the myriad constitutional issues that arose in the First Congress for discussion in this paper.

I. The New Government
A. Congress
1. Oaths
A constitutional issue of considerable jurisprudential significance was raised at the very outset
when the First Congress confronted the humble
question how to comply with Article VI's requirement that its members be "bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution," for Article VI
said nothing about how or when the oath should be
administered.
Five days after achieving a quorum, the House
adopted a resolution spelling out the form of the
oath to be taken by its members. Two days later, at
the House's request, the Chief Justice of New York
administered the oath in the form the resolution
had prescribed.
3

So far, so good; if the constitutional provision was
to take effect, someone had to figure out the details
of its implementation, and it made sense to conclude
that the bodies to whose officers the requirement
applied had implicit authority to do so-especially
in light of the general rulemaking authority given to
each House by Article 1, § 5. At the same time it
prescribed the form of the oath by resolution, however, the House appointed a committee to draft legislation on the same subject.
Insofar as legislators and legislative employees
were concerned, such a statute could be explained as
necessary and proper to the exercise of congressional
powers, since neither members nor staff could function without taking the oath. Nor could there have
been any constitutional objection to regulating the
oath that Article VI required of federal executive
and judicial officers, as the bill also did as it emerged
from the House-for the necessary and proper clause
empowered Congress to enact legislation carrying
into effect not only its own powers but also those
vested in any other federal officer or department,
and the regulation was as necessary for other officials
as for members of Congress themselves.
The difficulty arose when the Senate amended
the bill to prescribe the details of the oath to be
taken by state officers, who were also subject to the
requirement of Article VI. It was Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts who raised the constitutional objection when the bill returned to the House, and it was
a good one. No clause of the Constitution, he
argued, gave Congress authority to regulate the oath
to be taken by state officers. It was therefore up to
the states themselves to do so, and if they did not
federal judges would annul their acts for want of
constitutional authority to adopt them.
John Laurance of New York replied that Congress
had power to make "all laws necessary or proper to
carry the declarations of the constitution into effect"
and thus to implement Article VI, but he was mistaken. As Gerry had already noted, Article I spoke
only of laws needed to carry out the powers vested in
some federal body. New Jersey's Elias Boudinot had a
better justification:
The constitution said only that the officers of
Government should be bound by oath, leaving to
Congress to say what oath. In short it was the
4

duty of the House . . . to detail the general princi-

ples laid down in the constitution, and reduce
them to practice.
In other words, Article VI itself implicitly authorized Congress to implement its provisions.
This was not a necessary conclusion. The principle that had justified the House in prescribing the
form of the oath for its own personnel would have
justified the states in doing the same for theirs.
Indeed Article IV's explicit provision authorizing
Congress to effectuate the full faith and credit clause
arguably strengthens the inference that when the
Framers wanted Congress to implement constitutional provisions they said so. On the other hand, as
Chief Justice Marshall would later tell us, the last
thing the necessary and proper clause was meant to
do was to limit the authority implicit in other constitutional provisions.4 Like the sweeping clause
itself, the power to flesh out full faith and credit may
have been inserted out of an abundance of caution.
In any event, the statute as enacted regulated the
oath to be taken by state as well as federal officers.'
Four years later this action served as precedent for
the far more significant Fugitive Slave Act,6 which
implemented a clause of Article IV that was as silent
with respect to congressional authority as the oath
provision of Article VI. It was in the emotionally
charged context of fugitive slaves that the Supreme
Court would ultimately accept Boudinot's argument
of implied authority in the great case of Prigg v.
Pennsylvania.'
2. Enumeration
A basic question regarding the extent of congressional authority to acquire information arose when
Congress turned to implementing the command of
Article 1, § 2 that a census be taken within three
years after its first meeting.
In contrast to the oath requirement of Article VI,
the census provision explicitly provided for congressional implementation: The enumeration was to be
4

McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US 316, 420 (1819).
Stat 23 (June 1, 1789).
Id at 302 (Feb 12, 1793).
741 US 539 (1842).
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made "in such manner as [Congress] shall by law
direct." The interesting question was the permissible
scope of the information that was to be obtained.
The purpose of the enumeration, according to
Article I, was to provide the basis for apportioning
both congressional seats and direct taxes among the
states "according to their respective numbers." Those
numbers, the Constitution further provided, were to
be determined by counting the number of "free persons," excluding "Indians not taxed," and adding
"three fifths of all other persons"-that is, of the
slaves.' As enacted, however, the census bill required
that the population be further broken down by sex and
by age-although neither of these characteristics was
relevant to the purposes for which the Constitution
required the enumeration to be made.9 Indeed, at one
point the bill had been even broader, requiring the
census-takers to classify the population by occupation
as well. This requirement was later deleted, but both
the earlier version and the statute itself raised the
question whether Congress was not seeking more
information than it had any right to demand.
It was the ubiquitous Madison who had promoted
the idea of a census of occupations, and he had
waxed enthusiastic over the utility of the information it would produce. Several members objected,
arguing among other things that the inquiry would
serve no legitimate purpose and might lead the public to suspect ulterior congressional designs.
Commendably, Madison made no effort to
defend his additional questions on the basis of the
census provision. His position was that knowledge of
individual occupations would be useful to Congress
in devising later substantive legislation:
I take it, sir, that in order to accommodate our
laws to the real situation of our constituents, we
ought to be acquainted with that situation.

. .

. If

gentlemen have any doubts with respect to [the]
utility [of this information], I cannot satisfy them
in a better manner, than by referring them to the
debates which took place on the bills intended
collaterally to benefit the agricultural, commer8 US Const, Art 1, § 2. See also id, Art I, § 9: "No capitation, or
other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or
enumeration herein before directed to be taken."
9 I Stat 101, § 1 (March 1, 1790).
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cial, and manufacturing parts of the community.
Did they not wish then to know the relative proportion of each, and the exact number of every
division, in order that they might rest their arguments on facts, instead of assertions and conjectures? Will any gentleman pretend to doubt but
our regulations would have been better accommodated to the real state of society than they are?
In short, the information that went beyond what
was required for the apportionment of representatives and taxes was necessary and proper to the
informed enactment of legislation on various subjects within the express authority of Congress.
Similar arguments were later to support a broad
power of congressional investigation.o The inclusion
of questions concerning age and sex in the original
census suggests that Congress was already persuaded
by the essence of Madison's position.
B. The Special Role of the Senate
Apart from impeachment, the functions of the
House of Representatives were restricted to those
incident to legislation and to the quasi-legislative
process of constitutional amendment. The Senate,
on the other hand, was given a role to play in two
important functions otherwise entrusted to the
executive: the appointment of officers and the making of treaties. For Article II, § 2 empowered the
President to make both appointments and treaties
"by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate"-requiring a two-thirds majority in the latter
case. The President and the Senate devoted considerable efforts during the First Congress to defining
their respective roles with respect to executive affairs.
1. The FrenchConsular Convention
In July 1789, the Senate requested John Jaywho, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs under the
Confederation, was still in office-to appear and
inform the Senators about a consular agreement that
Jefferson had concluded with France in November
1788. The Secretary appeared and argued that the
'0 McGrainv Daugherty, 273 US 135 (1927).

7

treaty should be approved. The Senators agreed,
unanimously resolving "[tihat the Senate do consent
to the said convention, and advise the President of
the United States to ratify the same."
This episode passed without recorded friction, but
it set several interesting precedents. First, the consular agreement had been concluded before the first
meeting of the new Congress; both the President
and the Senate assumed that the advice and consent
provision nevertheless applied. Second, the Senate
explicitly gave advice as well as consent, imparting
not only its own imprimatur but also an unequivocal
suggestion as to how the President should exercise
his authority to perform the distinct act of final ratification. The form of the resolution thus illustrates
both the imprecision of the common reference to
Senate "ratification" of treaties and the original
understanding that the President retained discretion
to withhold ratification after the Senate had given
its consent.
Finally, the consular incident demonstrates that
the Senate understandably interpreted its treaty
responsibilities to give it implicit power to acquire
the information needed for their intelligent exercise
and to confer in person with executive officers in
order to obtain it. Indeed, although the order respecting Jay's appearance was cautiously phrased as a
"request[ ," the cruder terms employed a few days
earlier in "order[ing]" that the Secretary furnish
copies of relevant documents and report on the
accuracy of a translation appeared to assert the additional right to employ compulsory process against a
high executive official. Nevertheless the failure of
either Jay or Washington to raise any objection
based upon executive privilege cannot be taken to
concede this important principle, since the
President had directed the Secretary in advance to
provide "whatever official Papers and information
on the subject" the Senate might require.
2. The Southern Indians
Not long afterward, President Washington
peremptorily informed the Senators that he would
meet them in their chamber at 11:30 the next morning "to advise with them on the Terms of the Treaty
to be negotiated with the Southern Indians." He
appeared as scheduled with War Secretary Henry
8

Knox in tow and laid before the Senate a detailed
written statement of facts and questions in which he
solicited the Senate's advice on what position to
take in the coming negotiations.
This intricate document was read aloud twice
over the din of passing carriages," and then VicePresident Adams began to ask for yes or no answers
to the questions the President had posed. Maclay
rose to object: "The business is new to the Senate, it
is of importance, it is our duty to inform ourselves as
well as possible on the subject." When he moved to
refer the questions to a committee for that purpose,
Washington "started up in a Violent fret" and
remonstrated that "[t]his defeats every purpose of my
coming here." Ultimately, however, he agreed to
postpone the remaining consultation until the following Monday, when after debating the merits of
each question in Washington's presence the Senate
gave him the requested advice.
This famous confrontation resolved three critical
questions regarding the Senate's authority with
respect to treaties. First, both the President and the
Senate plainly interpreted the power to advise and
consent to include not merely approval of the finished product but also discussion in advance of the
course of action to be pursued. Thus, the original
understanding seems to have been that at least with
regard to treaties the Senate would function as a true
advisory council, not simply as a check on the arbitrary exercise of power.
Second, as seemed to follow from their shared
conception of the Senate's role as an advisory council, both parties plainly thought it appropriate for
the President to consult with the Senate in person.
Even when nothing was wanted beyond simple consent, as an earlier incident had shown, there was
ample room for misunderstanding if the matter was
handled entirely in writing; it seemed to go without
saying that the flexibility of oral discussion would
facilitate the giving of actual advice.
At the same time, however, Washington's
method of seeking advice in the case of the
1"I could tell it was something about indians," Senator Maclay
wrote in his diary after the first reading, "but was not master of one
Sentence of it." 9 Doc Hist at 128. This diary is the only more or
less comprehensive account of the debates in the Senate during the
First Congress, since the Senate did not open its doors to the public
until 1795.
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Southern Indians posed a patent threat to the independence of the Senate in performing its advisory
function. If the Senate was to participate meaningfully in the exercise, it required an opportunity
both to study the President's proposals and to discuss
them when the President was not around. "I saw no
chance of a fair investigation," Maclay had whispered at one point to Morris, "while the President of
the U.S. sat there with his Secretary at War, to support his Opinions and over awe the timid and neutral part of the Senate."
In insisting on postponing their answers until
they could study the President's inquiries on their
own, the senators assured themselves the autonomy
without which they could hardly have performed the
checking function contemplated by Article II; and
thus the third result of the confrontation over the
Southern Indians was to resolve apparently for all
time a major issue of the balance of power between
the two organs of government. The price of the
Senate's victory was high, however, for Washington
responded to his procedural defeat by resolving
never to ask the Senate for advice in person again.
C. The Executive Branch
1. Emoluments and Titles
Article II, § 1 provided that the President should
"receive for his services, a compensation, which
shall neither be increased nor diminished during the
period for which he shall have been elected," and
that he should "not receive within that period any
other emolument from the United States, or any of
them." Alexander Hamilton had explained the reasons for these provisions in the Federalist. "[A]
power over a man's support" was "a power over his
will"; the salary guarantee meant that Congress
could "neither weaken [the President's] fortitude by
operating upon his necessities; nor corrupt his integrity, by appealing to his avarice;" the ban on
other emoluments assured that he would have "no
pecuniary inducement to renounce or desert the
independence intended for him by the
Constitution. "12
Washington caused something of a stir in his first
12The
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Federalist,No 73.

inaugural address by disclaiming his constitutional
compensation. His sense of duty, he announced, had
always required him to serve his country without
remuneration; and thus he requested Congress in making "estimates for the station in which I am placed" to
provide only for payment of "such actual expenditures
as the public good may be thought to require."
Undeterred, Congress proceeded to debate and
enact a statute providing the President with a $25,000
annual salary." John Page of Virginia began the
House discussion by denying that Washington had
the right to refuse his pay: "[Tihe constitution
requires that he shall receive a compensation, and it is
our duty to provide it." This was not a frivolous argument, for the salary provision was not designed for the
President's benefit. If the constitutional premise was
that financial independence was a crucial barrier to
corruption, an officer who impoverished himself by
declining his wages endangered the public interest.
Moreover, if Washington was right that he need not
accept his money, there would always be the risk that
a President's waiver was not truly voluntary; reading
the Constitution to mean what it said would obviate
the need for inquiry on this unpromising score. Thus,
Congress determined that Washington would be compensated whether he liked it or not, and he ended up
by accepting his salary.
The controversy over the practical question of
whether the President should be paid, however, was
pallid in comparison to the dispute that had raged at
the very beginning over the purely formal question
of how he should be addressed. In April 1789, apparently at the instigation of Vice-President Adams, a
joint committee was appointed to consider "what
style or titles [if any] it will be proper to annex to the
offices of President and Vice-President of the United
States."" The committee recommended that no
titles be added to those specified in the
Constitution, and the House agreed. The Senate
balked, and a Senate committee then proposed that
the President be addressed as "His Highness, the
President of the United States of America, and Protector of their Liberties."
Maclay argued that any such title would be
"1 Stat 72 (Sept 24, 1789).
14In return for his pains Adams himself came to be referred to in
private as "His Rotundity."
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unconstitutional. The Constitution had "designated
our Chief Magistrate by the Appellation of The
President of the U.S. of America," and Congress
could neither "add to [nior diminish it, without
infringing the Constitution." Moreover, Article 1, §
9 expressly provided that "no title of nobility
sh[ould] be granted by the United States"; "the
appellations & Terms given to Nobility in the old
World" were "contraband language" in this country.
This quarrel may seem petty, but in adopting the
nobility provision the Framers themselves had plainly recognized the importance of symbols. One thing
both the Revolution and the Constitution were all
about was to substitute a republic for an aristocracy,
and to abjure exalted forms of address served to
underline our commitment to that decision. When
the House refused to recede from its disagreement,
the Senate passed a resolution sulkily affirming the
desirability of additional titles in order "to assure a
due respect for the majesty of the people of the
United States" in intercourse with other nations"
but yielding for the moment in the interest of "preserving harmony with the House of Representatives." That was the last that was heard about His
Highness the Protector of our Liberties; ever since
the President has been simply "the President of the
United States," as Article II provides.
3. Ambassadors
Recognizing that the President could not carry
out his executive responsibilities all by himself,
Congress in 1789 passed statutes establishing the
great offices of Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary
of War, and Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The
debates concerning the President's power to remove
these officers are well known and were heavily
relied on by the Supreme Court in the famous case
of Myers v. United States.' 6 Less familiar but no less
intriguing were the provisions made the next year
with respect to ambassadors, public ministers, and
consuls.
Article II plainly contemplates that Congress
may create executive offices necessary and proper to
1 Adams at one point in the debate reminded the Senate that
"there were Presidents of Fire Companies & of a Cricket Club."
' 272 US 52 (1926).
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the execution of various federal powers, for it
expressly authorizes the President, with Senate consent, to appoint "all other officers of the United
States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by law."
Yet when Congress turned to providing for intercourse with other nations it conspicuously refrained
from creating any offices at all, simply authorizing
the President to draw up to $40,000 per year from
the Treasury "for the support of such persons as he
shall commission to serve the United States in foreign parts" and to pay their expenses."
A closer look at the Constitution may suggest
why. Article II empowers the President not only to
nominate functionaries whose offices have been
created by legislation, but to nominate "ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, [and]
judges of the Supreme Court" as well. The text thus
gives some support to Smith's argument that the
President and Senate should "determine when and
where to send ambassadors and other public ministers; all that the House has to do is to make provision for their support."
The textual argument applies to justices as well as
to diplomats, and Congress fixed the number of the
former at six." It may be that Congress thought it
had the power but not the duty to fix the number of
offices in both cases and chose to exercise its authority only in the case of the judges. The contrast may
also suggest, however, that the constitutional principle that dissuaded Congress from creating particular diplomatic offices was found not in the second
section of Article II but in the third.
For buried near the end of that section was an
apparently innocuous provision directing the
President to "receive ambassadors and other public
ministers." This duty could have been construed in a
purely ceremonial sense, but it was not. It has long
been understood that the decision to receive a foreign diplomat embodies a decision to recognize the
government that dispatched him, and thus that the
reception clause empowers the President to decide
with which governments the United States shall
have diplomatic relations." For Congress to create
"I Star 128, §1 (July 1, 1790).
181 Stat 73, § 1 (Sept 24, 1789).
19United States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 330 (1937).
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an embassy to Lower Slobbovia would appear to
conflict with this presidential responsibility.
Yet congressional reticence in this case was not
confined to the question of what diplomatic offices
should be established. The statute did not even prescribe what salary was to be paid to such envoys as
the President with Senate consent might decide to
appoint; it merely set upper limits to the sums that
could be paid to individual officers and to the total
that could be expended in a single year.
The arguments on this provision had been largely
a reprise of the controversy over presidential
removal, ranging from the suggestion that the determination of salaries was incident to appointment or
to treaty-making and thus could be made only by the
President with Senate consent to the position that it
was an executive function entrusted to the President
alone. Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania, however, put
forward a new argument that had not been available
in the removal debate:
I think disposing of, or giving away sums of
public money, is a Legislative, not an Executive
act, and cannot be performed in any other way
than with all the formalities of Legislative
authority.
Thus, there was no point in arguing over whether
salaries should be set by the President alone or with
Senate consent, because "it would be improper to
give it to either"; the setting of salaries being a legislative responsibility, Congress could not constitutionally delegate it to anyone else.
This argument was given credence by the provision of Article 1, § 9 that no money should be drawn
from the Treasury "but in consequence of appropriations made by law." Of course it was true that the
bill did authorize the withdrawal of funds from the
Treasury, but the Constitution arguably required
Congress to determine not only how much to spend
but also how to spend it. Sedgwick replied that
Congress had already recognized the necessity for
discretionary spending authority in providing for
military supply. This exchange was an opening salvo
in a continuing battle over the proper degree of
specificity in congressional appropriations.
As in the removal debate, Laurance took the position that the Constitution did not answer the ques14

tion, and this time the majority evidently agreed. In
prescribing ceilings for the remuneration of various
types of officers Congress rejected the thesis that the
Constitution reserved the matter to the President
with or without consent of the Senate; in leaving it
to the President to determine the appropriate compensation within those limits it rejected the argument that salaries could be set only by statute. The
bottom line seemed to be that Congress could decide
one way or another under its authority to enact laws
necessary and proper to the execution of powers
granted by the Constitution to various officers and
departments of the federal government.20

II. Substantive Legislation
A. Taxes and Trade
1. Tariffs and Tonnage
No government can run without money, and the
dependence of the old Congress on contributions
from the states had been a principal source of discontent with the Articles of Confederation. One of
the central innovations of the Philadelphia
Convention was the general federal tax power conferred by the first clause of Article 1, § 8: "The
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of
the United States." Congress thus had a wide choice
of means for supporting the operations of the new
Government. It decided to rely principally on customs duties on imported goods and tonnage duties
on foreign and domestic vessels.21
The most striking feature of the tariff law was the
candid admission in its first section that its purposes
included not only the support of government and
the payment of debts but also "the encouragement
and protection of manufactures." In April 1789, as
the House began debating the revenue question, it
received a petition from a long list of Baltimore
20 Consistently with this analysis, Congress now regulates the
salaries of diplomats while still leaving it to the President to determine
where to send them. Foreign Service Act of 1980, 94 Star 2071, title 1,
chs 3-4.
21 1 Stat 24 (tariffs), 27 (tonnage).
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tradesmen complaining of the tendency of their fellow citizens to fritter away the nation's wealth "in
the purchase of those articles, from foreigners, which
our citizens, if properly encouraged, were fully competent to furnish" and urging Congress to impose
"on all foreign articles, which can be made in
America, such duties as will give a just and decided
preference to the[ ] labors" of American artisans and
"discountenanc[e] that trade which tends so materially to injure them, and impoverish their country."
These sentiments found many adherents in the
House. Thomas Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania began by
proposing specific duties on a long list of imported
items from beer to nuts with the avowed purpose,
among others, "to encourage the productions of our
country, and protect our manufactures." Other members scrambled for a piece of the action. Clymer
sought protection for steel and paper, Moore and
Heister for hemp, Carroll for glass, Bland and Parker
for Virginia coal. Fisher Ames made quite a touching little oration on the virtues of cottage industries
in advocating a protective tariff on nails. Roger
Sherman pleaded for a six-cent tariff on manufactured tobacco on the express ground that "the duty
ought to amount to a prohibition," and he got it.
There were objections to several of these suggestions, but no one denied that Congress could
constitutionally impose tariffs in order to stimulate
domestic production, and it did so. Fitzsimons suggested a plausible basis for this authority in urging a
discriminatory duty on tea shipped in foreign vessels
"not only as a revenue but as a regulation of a commerce highly advantageous to the United States."
Fitzsimons's argument that differential duties for
the promotion of American shipping constituted a
regulation of foreign commerce suggested two interesting conclusions respecting the commerce power.
The first was that a measure could qualify as a regulation of commerce even though it took the shape of
a tax; not form but purpose and effect were determinative. The second was that the power to regulate
commerce included the power to restrict it. In the
immediate context this was hardly surprising, since
one justification for giving Congress authority to
regulate foreign commerce had been to permit it to
retaliate against and therefore to deter foreign
restrictions. But the decision of the First Congress
with respect to foreign commerce seemed likely also
16

to have an impact on the interpretation of the parallel clause regarding commerce among the several
states, although the specific reason for giving this
latter authority to Congress had been to enable it to
remove obstacles to freedom of trade.
A further step would be necessary to find a commerce-power justification for duties designed to promote production, since neither agriculture nor
industry was "commerce" within the ordinary meaning of the term. In one sense that step would not be
difficult to take, since protective tariffs restrict commerce itself by increasing the price of exchange; but
acceptance of this position would mean that
Congress could regulate foreign commerce in order
to encourage conduct it presumably could not regulate directly. That in itself would be a significantly
broad interpretation of congressional power, and it
would later be hotly disputed;22 but it would be less
threatening to reserved state powers than the alternative explanation that the essentially unlimited tax
power might likewise be used for ulterior ends.2 3
Many of the members who spoke during the
debate on the tariff and tonnage laws seemed to
think it entirely appropriate to use the tax power
itself for the promotion of goals unrelated to revenue. Fitzsimons himself, the exponent of the commerce-clause thesis, bolstered his plea for high duties
on liquor with an argument based entirely on health
and morals: If the result was to discourage the consumption of alcoholic beverages, so much the better,
because alcohol was "a luxury of the most mischievous kind." Finally, in adopting a duty on tobacco
products that had explicitly been justified as a prohibition Congress seemed to lend strength to the extreme position that taxes might be levied even when
they served no revenue purpose at all.
Of course, as Justice Robert Jackson would later
observe, economic incentives are inseparable from
taxation: "[AIIl taxation has a tendency . . . to discourage the activity taxed."" Indeed, so far as the
text was concerned, Article I could easily be read to
22

See Champion v Ames (the Lottery Case), 188 US 321 (1903);

Hammer v Dagenhart, 247 US 251 (1918); United States v Darby, 312

US 100 (1941)

23 See McCray v United States, 195 US 27 (1904); Bailey v Drexel
FurnitureCo. (the Child Labor Tax Case), 259 US 20 (1922).
24 United States v Kahriger, 345 US 22, 35 (1953) (concurring
opinion).
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permit Congress to levy taxes in order not only to
pay the debts and provide for defense but also to
promote "the general welfare"-in other words, for
any reason that was good for the nation as a whole.
On the other hand, indifference to the purpose and
effect of measures cast in the form of taxes could
obliterate the limitations on federal regulatory powers that were implicit in the initial enumeration and
confirmed by the First Congress in proposing the
Tenth Amendment.
Because all the incentive provisions of the tariff
and tonnage laws can be explained on the narrower
ground that they effectively regulated interstate or
foreign commerce, neither of these statutes proves
that the legislators believed they could accomplish
by taxation that which they could not do directly.
At the very least, however, they demonstrate that
the First Congress took a broad view of the purposes
for which it could regulate commerce; and those
who would later argue that the tax power could be
exercised only for revenue purposes would have a
good deal of explaining to do.
2. Whiskey
Before Congress had been in business two years,
it felt obliged to tap additional sources of revenue.
As several speakers had emphasized during the 1789
debates, there were limits to how high customs
duties could be raised without provoking widespread
smuggling. Convinced that direct taxation "would
be contrary to the sentiments of the majority of the
people," Madison accordingly proposed an excise on
the domestic production of ardent spirits as "the
least exceptionable" option.
Whiskey producers were not so sure, and as
usual some of their arguments took constitutional
shape. Jackson objected that the burden of the tax
fell unequally on the South, which had "no breweries or orchards to furnish a substitute" for
whiskey. Hugh Williamson of North Carolina tied
this argument to Article I's requirement that excises be "uniform throughout the United States" and
urged the House "to equalise them, by proposing a
tax on beer and cider."
Similar arguments had been raised and rejected in
the tariff debate, and they were rejected again as the
whiskey tax was adopted. Since the tariffs could be
18

justified as regulations of commerce, rejection of the
inequality argument in that context might be
explained on the unappetizing ground that Congress
could evade the uniformity requirement by invoking
some power other than that of taxation. No such
argument was available, however, in the case of the
whiskey excise; Congress seems to have concluded
both that the Constitution required only geographical uniformity (as suggested by the term "uniform
throughout the United States") and that the tax was
uniform because it was nondiscriminatory on its face.
To require that the actual burden of taxation be
distributed equally throughout the nation would
have posed formidable accounting difficulties, but
Justice Nelson's later example of a New York tax
impartially imposed on domestic and out-of-state
cotton suggests the possibilities of abuse invited by
limiting the inquiry to facial discrimination.25 We
had by no means heard the last of arguments that
various constitutional guarantees required de facto as
well as de jure equality. 6
Other objections to the whiskey tax implicated
provisions of the new Bill of Rights, which Congress
had proposed in 1789 and which was ratified the
same year the excise was adopted. Parker zeroed in
on "the mode of collecting the tax," which he
argued would "let loose a swarm of harpies" who
would "range through the country, prying into every
man's house and affairs." The modern reader will
take this argument as a reminder to measure the
enforcement provisions of the statute against the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable
searches and seizures."
In fact the act raised interesting questions in this
regard, for in addition to authorizing the issuance of
warrants to search any place where spirits were suspected of being fraudulently concealed it empowered
revenue agents without any ground for suspicion and
without procuring a warrant to enter any registered
distillery or warehouse "at all times in the daytime"
in order to sample and measure the inventory.
Whether it was the regulated nature of the business
or the voluntary act of distilling or storing liquor in
the face of the registration and inspection provisions
that made this requirement reasonable no one both25
26

Woodruff v Parham,75 US 123, 145-46 (1869) (dissenting opinion).
Cf, e.g., Washington v Davis, 426 US 229 (1976).
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ered to say, but Congress evidently thought there
was no constitutional problem.
Jackson perceived a distinct threat in the dreaded
host of federal tax collectors and proposed to meet it
"by adding a clause to prevent Inspectors, or any
officers under them, from interfering, either directly
or indirectly, in elections, further than giving their
own votes." Sherman and Livermore made clear that
the objection was to "electioneering" by federal
agents whose duties would afford them "such a
knowledge of persons and characters, as will give
them great advantages, and enable them to influence elections to a great degree." Jackson added that
his proposal was made more imperative by "the dangerous influence that some future Presidents would
acquire, by virtue of the power which [they] will possess of removing these officers."
John Vining of Delaware responded that Jackson's
proposal was unconstitutional, as it would deprive
revenue officers of the right "of speaking and writing
their minds." Maryland's Joshua Seney replied that no
rights would be infringed because "it would be optional to accept the offices or not," but Jackson's motion
to muzzle the revenuers was decisively rejected.
Thus, the First Congress gave us a concise but
cogent preview of the arguments that were to be made
many years later with respect to the constitutionality
of the Hatch Act." While there were plenty of other
objections to stripping civil servants of rights fundamental to the operation of republican government,
Vining provided us at the outset with powerful
ammunition based on the speech and press guarantees
that Congress itself had recently proposed.
3. Seamen
Possibly the most ambitious exercise of the commerce power during the First Congress was the
enactment in July 1790 of a comprehensive labor
law for merchant seamen.28 On the one hand, this
Act provided stringent sanctions against sailors who
deserted or failed to report and those who harbored
them. On the other, it guaranteed crew members a
written contract, prompt payment of wages, ade27 See United Public Workers v Mitchell, 330 US 75 (1947); Civil
Service Commission v Letter Carriers, 413 US 548 (1973).
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1 Stat 131 (July 20, 1790).

quate medicines and provender, and the right to
require a leaky vessel to put into port for repairs.
Unfortunately, the Annals report no debate on
these provisions. Their most plausible source of support was the commerce clause, and that was the basis
on which they were subsequently explained. It was
not obvious, however, that a regulation of the care
and feeding of seamen was a regulation of commerce. Transportation was commerce, as the ship licensing law implied, and crew members were
engaged in transportation. Yet the law regulated not
transportation itself but the labor relations of those
who did the transporting.
On the other hand, both the duties and the rights
created by this law obviously promoted commerce by
assuring that ships would be properly manned. If the
bill did not regulate commerce itself it could easily
be found necessary and proper to the commerce
power. In the early twentieth century, when
Congress for similar reasons attempted to give railroad workers the right to join unions and to receive
pensions, the Supreme Court held it had exceeded
its powers.2 9 The First Congress plainly took a broader view of its commerce clause authority.
4. The Slave Trade
The clouds of future storms darkened the halls of
Congress in February 1790, when Representative
Fitzsimons presented an address from an assembly of
Quakers urging Congress to do something about the
slave trade. South Carolina's William Smith protested that the House should not even consider the petition because Article I, § 9 deprived Congress of the
power to ban importation of slaves into existing
states before 1808. Madison appropriately responded
that the same provision expressly permitted a federal
tax not exceeding ten dollars a head and suggested
that Congress might also have authority to outlaw
the transportation of slaves from Africa to the West
Indies in American ships-thus implying both that
the transportation of slaves was commerce and that
trade "with foreign nations" included trade by
Americans between them.
29 Adair v United States, 208 US 161 (1908); Railroad Retirement
Board v Alton Railroad, 295 US 330 (1935); The Second Century at 27,

232-33.
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Jackson of Georgia protested that anything done
to suppress the slave trade might threaten slavery
itself, and the very next day a memorial signed by
no less a personage than Benjamin Franklin urged
Congress to take steps under unspecified powers to
free the slaves. Representatives from the deep South
began to squeal like stuck pigs. Smith warned that
emancipation would offend the constitutional ban
on ex post facto legislation, and Tucker warned that
it would bring about "civil war." Madison responded
that Congress had authority to regulate slavery in
the western territory and even the introduction of
slaves into new states that might be formed there.
Gerry suggested that Congress might raise money to
purchase slaves and set them free by selling lands in
the western territories. The protesters were noisy
but badly outnumbered; both petitions were referred
to a committee for consideration.
Predictably, the committee reported that
Congress had no power to interfere with slavery
itself, or to forbid importation of additional slaves
to the original states before 1808. It added, however, that Congress did have authority to impose a
ten-dollar tax on each slave imported, to forbid citizens to transport slaves between foreign countries,
and "to make provision for the humane treatment
of slaves" during the course of importation. The
report concluded by urging that Congress exercise
all these powers "for the humane objects of the
memorialists, so far as they can be promoted on the
principles of justice, humanity, and good policy."
This committee report provoked another five
days of heated debate. Aedanus Burke of South
Carolina insisted that slavery was good for slaves
and vilified the Quakers. Smith enlarged upon
Burke's remarks, trumpeted states' rights, and disparaged blacks in general. Boudinot expatiated at
length on the evils of slavery, acknowledged that
there were serious limits to what Congress could do
about it, and stood up for the petitioners. The
upshot was a report of the Committee of the Whole
House restating the original committee's conclusions concerning the extent of congressional powers
but omitting any reference to the desirability of
their exercise.
With that the House dropped the subject for the
time being, but the spirit of dissension it had awakened had come to stay.
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B. Spending
1. Lighthouses
In August 1789, Congress authorized construction of a lighthouse near the mouth of Chesapeake
Bay, as well as the expenditure of federal funds for
the maintenance and repair of all "lighthouses, beacons, buoys and public piers" previously erected for
navigational purposes at "any bay, inlet, harbor, or
port of the United States" pending their prompt cession to the United States.30 Thus, the aim of this
enactment was to put the federal government in the
business of constructing, operating, and financing a
nationwide system of aids to navigation. The interesting question from the constitutional point of view
is where it got the authority to do so.
Observers in the late twentieth century are likely
to think at once of the first clause of Article 1, § 8,
which empowers Congress "to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of
the United States." Acknowledging that the enumeration of congressional powers precludes interpreting this provision to support all legislation that
promotes the general welfare, the modern Supreme
Court has read it to justify taxation to acquire and
expend funds for any such purpose 3 -and thus to
confer a power that, as experience has taught, goes
far to break down the Constitution's carefully crafted limitations on federal authority.3 2
It would be remarkable if the First Congress had
entertained any such view of its powers, and in fact
the most obvious source of authority for federal navigational aids was the commerce clause. Navigation is
commerce, as Congress had earlier concluded in
enacting a ship licensing law; buoys, beacons, and
lighthouses promote interstate and foreign trade
and, thus, are necessary and proper to carry out the
purposes for which the commerce power was granted. This seemed to be Madison's theory in advocating that tonnage duties be imposed in order to sup30

1 Stat 53, 53-54, §§ 1, 2 (Aug 7, 1789).

United States v Butler, 297 US 1, 64 (1936).
See South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203 (1987) (upholding a
statute withholding federal highway funds from states that permitted
the sale of alcoholic beverages to persons under 21 years of age).
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port lighthouses, marine hospitals, "and other establishments incidental to commerce"; and Fitzsimons
expressly embraced it in opposing Tucker's suggestion that the entire subject be left to the states.
The immediate objection to this line of reasoning
is that the construction and operation of these establishments is not itself regulation of commerce, and
not obviously necessary or proper for its regulation,
which is what the Constitution seems literally to
require. In light of the patent relation between navigation aids and the purposes of the commerce provision, however, it may be appropriate not to parse the
necessary and proper clause with all the ferocity of a
medieval conveyancer. As Chief Justice Marshall
would soon admonish us, it was a constitution we
were expounding.
2. Other Spending Proposals
Three spending suggestions that could not be so
easily justified were made to the First Congress.
Their fate illustrates the diversity of views as to the
extent of congressional authority to spend.
The first was the argument of two Virginia
representatives that Congress should underwrite a
private voyage to Baffin's Bay in search of a better
understanding of the magnetic pole. Neither explicitly identified the source of Congress's alleged authority. Page seemed to believe in a broad power to spend
for the general welfare, for he said only that the
knowledge to be obtained "would do honor to the
American name." In suggesting that the voyage
might contribute to "improving the science of navigation," Madison appeared to conjure up the ubiquitous commerce clause once again-though the relation to commerce seemed more attenuated here than
in the case of an honest-to-goodness lighthouse. Ignoring the commerce power, Tucker expressed doubt
whether the patent clause authorized Congress "to go
further in rewarding the inventors of useful
machines, or discoveries in sciences, than merely to
secure to them for a time the right of making, publishing and vending them"-a doubt solidly supported by the text of the provision. In the face of these
uncertainties the House agreed with the committee
recommendation not to subsidize the voyage "in the
present deranged state of our finances"; the constitutional question did not have to be decided.
24

The second spending suggestion was
Washington's startling invitation in his Annual
Message in 1790 to promote "science and literature"
either "by affording aids to seminaries of learning
already established" or "by the institution of a national university." Like Page and Madison, the
President did not discuss the issue of congressional
authority. His reference to the promotion of science
suggests the same reliance on the patent clause that
Tucker had so tellingly refuted a few months before,
and any argument that support for education might
produce information that would facilitate commerce
seems even more attenuated here than in the chilly
context of Baffin's Bay. Washington's additional
observation that knowledge was conducive to stability and good government might seem to imply that
support for education was necessary and proper to
the intelligent exercise of all federal powers, but he
seemed to be discussing policy rather than authority.
More probably he gave a broad reading to the general welfare clause, if he thought about the problem of
power at all. In any event Congress put the proposal
on the back burner; its constitutionality would be
seriously debated a few years later.
The final example of proposed federal spending
was a committee recommendation in June 1790 that
Congress authorize a loan of federal funds to rescue a
glass factory that found itself in straitened circumstances. In tones reminiscent of the famous Report
on Manufactures that Hamilton was to file a year
and a half later," Vining argued that Congress possessed "a general power to encourage the arts and
manufactures of the United States." His terminology
suggested he too had not looked closely enough at
the actual terms of the patent clause.
Smith and Sherman doubted that Congress could
"loan the money of their constituents," but as
Boudinot said their objection seemed too broad.
Loans, no less than outright grants, might well be
necessary and proper to the execution of some
express federal authority; the difficulty lay in finding
any power to which the support of a glass factory
could fairly be deemed incidental. Of course glass
was useful for commercial and military purposes, as
well as to provide windows in all sorts of govern3
1 American State Papers (Finance) 123; 10 Hamilton Papers at
230 (Dec 5, 1791).
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ment buildings; but such an argument would leave
little room for the powers that both the enumeration
and the Tenth Amendment clearly acknowledged to
be reserved only to the states. Ames's policy argument respecting the national interest in encouraging
manufactures seemed to reflect a more straightforward reliance on the general welfare clause, which
Boudinot, Seney, and Stone expressly invoked."
The committee's recommendation was rejected,
but not all of the objections to the loan were on
constitutional grounds. The question of the extent
of federal spending powers had been raised and
debated, but it had not yet been resolved.
3. Assumption of State Debts
The Revolution had been fought in substantial
part on credit, and many creditors had not been
paid. When a group of public creditors from
Pennsylvania petitioned for relief, the House adopted a resolution declaring that "an adequate provision
for the support of public credit" was "a matter of
high importance to the national honor and prosperity" and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to
propose an appropriate plan.
The Secretary was Alexander Hamilton. His
response was a lengthy Report on Public Credit," the
first in a remarkable series of reports in which the
Secretary set forth his comprehensive and ambitious
economic program.
The United States, wrote Hamilton, would need
to borrow money in the future (as Article 1, § 8
authorized Congress to do). They could borrow only
if their credit was good; and their credit would be
good only if they paid their debts. Thus, satisfaction
of existing claims was required not only by justice
but by self-interest as well. Money loaned by foreign3 Hamilton would be unequivocal in his recommendations to the
Second Congress with respect to manufactures: "Apart from the uniformity and apportionment requirements and the ban on export
duties, the power to raise money is plenary, and indefinite; and the
objects to which it may be appropriated are no less comprehensive,
than the payment of the public debts and the providing for the common defense and 'general Welfare.' The terms 'general Welfare.' were
doubtless intended to signify more than was expressed or imported in
those which Preceded; otherwise numerous exigencies incident to the
affairs of a Nation would have been left without a provision."
3s 6 Hamilton Papers at 65; 1 American State Papers (Finance) 15; 2
Annals (Appendix) at 2041.
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ers, he argued, should be paid back in full. The
domestic debt, in contrast, should be refinanced
rather than retired. Finally, Congress should also
provide for paying off existing debts of individual
states since it was in a better position to raise
money-and since after all many state obligations
had been incurred in the interest of common
defense.
Congress wrestled with Hamilton's proposals for
nearly six months and ultimately adopted the
essence of his suggestions. 6 In the process
Washington's closest confidant became the leader of
the opposition and the future capital was fixed on
the banks of the Potomac. For present purposes,
however, the most important aspect of the controversy is the interesting constitutional questions that
it raised.

In both political and constitutional terms, the
most fascinating controversy respecting public credit
was that concerning Hamilton's proposal that
Congress assume the debts of the several states.
Predictably, those states which had already discharged the bulk of their obligations tended to be
less than eager to help discharge the obligations of
others. Moreover, several Representatives recognized-as Hamilton is said to have intended-that
federal assumption would enhance the power of the
federal government relative to that of the states by
reducing the necessity for state taxation.
At the constitutional level, Stone began by
observing that Article I empowered Congress to pay
only the "debts ... of the United States," not those

of individual states. Once state debts were assumed,
of course, they would become debts of the United
States; but that did not prove that Congress had the
power to assume them. Nor was Article VI of much
assistance in this regard, for it made debts good
against the new Congress only to the extent they
had been good against the old; it too seemed to
apply only to obligations of the United States.
Sedgwick found authority for the assumption of
state debts in a broad reading of the general welfare
clause of Article 1, § 8, which he said authorized
Congress "to levy money in all instances where, in
their opinion, the expenditure shall be for the 'gen36 1 Stat

138 (Aug 4, 1790).
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[I]f prudence, policy, and justice
dictated the assumption of the State debts it must be
for the general welfare that they should be assumed."
Even before Sedgwick spoke, however, Stone had
branded as "dangerous" any argument that Congress
could tax and spend for a purpose that might be
deemed "salutary" but that was "not a constitutional
object of their power";" and most defenders of
assumption espoused a narrower justification.
The debts in question, Sherman argued, had been
incurred for the most part (as Hamilton had noted)
"for the common defense." That defense had been
the responsibility of Congress, but Congress had
been unable to raise the requisite funds.
Consequently, the states had contracted obligations
as agents of Congress; from the beginning the state
eral welfare'[:] ...

debts had been "debts . . . of the United States."

Two former members of the constitutional convention, relied on their recollection of its proceedings in
support of their conflicting interpretations. Madison
insisted that the Convention had decided not to
assume state debts, Gerry that it had taken for granted Congress would have power to do so.
The House initially voted against assumption. At
that point Secretary of State Jefferson arranged an
informal meeting between Hamilton and Madison,
who as representative of a state that had paid most
of its own debts had opposed assumption tooth and
nail. The result was a compromise whereby in
exchange for assumption of debts actually incurred
for the common defense Virginia was given both
assurance of reimbursement for the sums it had
already expended and the future seat of the national
government, but the breach between Madison and
the Administration was never to be mended.
Conclusion
It should be plain from this summary that both
n During the Bank debate the following year, Madison would
insist that the general welfare clause was not an authorization at all
but only a limitation on the tax power. The terms of this provision, he
reminded the House, had been "copied from the articles of
Confederation; had it ever been pretended, that they were to be
understood otherwise than as here explained?" See the Articles of
Confederation, Art VIII: "All charges of war, and all other expenses
that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, . ..
shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by
the several States . . .
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the first President and the First Congress took the
Constitution very seriously. Constitutional questions
cropped up in the House and Senate every time
somebody sneezed, and one proposal after another
was subjected to intensive debate to determine its
compatibility with relevant constitutional provisions. Members of Congress plainly thought it necessary to demonstrate that the Constitution supported
their actions, and thus everything they did as well as
everything they said helps to inform our understanding of particular constitutional provisions.
The arguments employed during the First
Congress helped also to develop an understanding of
the techniques of constitutional interpretation. Most
of the tools of construction we recognize today were
employed in the debates: text, structure, history,
purpose, practice, the avoidance of absurd consequences. Despite the deliberate decision of the
Convention not to publish an official record of its
proceedings, various members invoked their recollection of events at Philadelphia to illuminate the
meaning of particular provisions; they were met with
very modem arguments for ignoring them.
The quality of the constitutional debates in the
First Congress was impressively high. To begin with,
the members exhibited an intimate knowledge of
what the Constitution actually said. Moreover, they
had obviously devoted considerable effort to trying
to figure out what its various provisions might mean.
In the great controversies over removal of cabinet
officers and incorporation of the Bank, the House
debates brought forth virtually all the constitutional
arguments that anyone has come up with in two
centuries of second-guessing-as they did on many
other issues of greater or lesser importance which as
a practical matter they settled for all time.
In short, not only the debates but also the actions
taken or rejected by the First Congress constitute a
practical interpretation of the Constitution by able
and diligent officers sworn to support it and charged
with the responsibility to put it into practice. The
legislative interpretation was not binding. It was not
always unanimous. It was not always convincing. It
was not always clear that Congress was even aware
of the existence of a constitutional problem.
Sometimes, like judges, members of Congress must
have been advocates for a predetermined position.
Nevertheless the records of the First Congress afford
29

important evidence of what thoughtful and responsible public servants close to the adoption of the
Constitution thought it meant. What they thought
is surely of interest not only to historians but also to
anyone trying two hundred years later to figure out
what the Constitution means.
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